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SUMMARY OP ARGUMENTS 
Due process is a constitutionally guaranteed protection for 
all citizens. Substantive due process requires that relevant legal 
principles be considered when making a judicial decision. When 
relevant legal factors are ignored, an abuse of discretion occurs 
resulting in a violation of a party's due process rights. The 
trial court's failure to consider the Westinghouse factors before 
dismissing the present action constitutes an abuse of discretion 
and a denial of plaintiffs' substantive due process rights. 
The final delay in the present case was caused by Defendants' 
request that the scheduled trial be continued to allow new counsel 
to appear for Defendants. But for the request to substitute 
attorneys, the case would have been tried in January, 1994. 
Defendants caused the last delay and have relied on that delay for 
their Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute. The trial 
court's dismissal rewards the defendants for their delay tactics. 
Plaintiffs have suffered a great injustice by this dismissal. 
Defendants committed accounting malpractice and cost Plaintiffs 
their fortune. Plaintiffs have been victimized not only by the 
practices of Defendants, but also by the dismissal which has 
stripped Plaintiffs of their opportunity for renumeration. 
Plaintiffs are entitled to the opportunity for a trial so that 




PLAINTIFFS1 DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED BY 
THE IMPROPER DISMISSAL OF ITS ACTION 
In Plaintiffs1 Brief on Appeal, they established a violation 
of their substantive due process rights when the trial court failed 
to consider the elements of Westinghouse Electric Supply Company 
Co. v. Paul Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah, 
1975), before dismissing Plaintiffs' cause of action with 
prejudice. Plaintiffs' due process rights demand the consideration 
of each element of Westinghouse in order to protect against a 
dismissal for arbitrary and capricious reasons. State v. Parker, 
872 P.2d 1041 (Utah App. 1994). When the trial court fails to 
consider the relevant elements established by judicial precedent, 
arbitrary and capricious decisions and abuses of discretion result. 
Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985). In the present case, 
the trial court abused its discretion in failing to specifically 
consider the Westinghouse elements for dismissal. This failure 
constitutes a violation of Plaintiffs' substantive due process 
rights. The trial court's decision, therefore, should be reversed 
and the matter remanded. 
In response to the Plaintiffs' substantive due process 
arguments, Defendants make only one unsubstantiated statement in 
their brief: 
. . . For Strands to argue their substantive due 
process rights have been violated . . . , ignores the 
fact that the Strands themselves have not been diligent 
in trying the matter. Strands, through their inaction, 
2 
have waived their own substantive due process rights as 
will be shown hereafter. 
Defendants never again refer to the due process arguments of 
Plaintiffs, and provide no authority for this alleged "waiver" of 
their due process rights. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that "cdurts 
indulge every presumption against the waiver of fundamental 
constitutional rights." Pitts v. Board of Education of U.S.D.. 869 
F.2d 555, 557 (10th Cir. 1989) (quoting from United States v. 
Williamson. 806 F.2d 216, 219 (10th Cir. 1986)). And, while due 
process rights may be waived, the waiver must be an intentional 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right. See Johnson v. 
Zerbst. 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). 
To avoid any perception that Plaintiffs waived their 
constitutional rights in the present case, Plaintiffs asked the 
trial court to reconsider its prior decision and expressly asked 
that court to recognize and protect their substantive due process 
rights in the second hearing. Thus, far from relinquishing those 
rights, Plaintiffs took affirmative action to protect their 
substantive due process rights. Unfortunately, the trial court 
simply ignored the Plaintiffs' rights and entered the dismissal. 
The fact that the trial court failed to consider and weigh the 
relevant factors at the conclusion of the second hearing 
constitutes a clear violation of Plaintiffs' constitutional rights. 
Nothing that Plaintiffs did or said could possibly be considered as 
a voluntary and knowing waiver or relinquishment of those rights. 
3 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
BY FAILING TO APPLY THE WESTINGHOUSE STANDARD 
IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S ACTION 
The trial court erred in dismissing Plaintiff's claims with 
prejudice without specifically considering the necessary elements 
in making that decision. The necessary elements of Westinghouse 
Electric Supply Co. v. Paul Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 
879 (Utah 1975), as set forth in Maxfield v. Rushton. 779 P.2d 237 
(Utah App. 1989), are: 
The factors which we consider may include the following: 
(1) the conduct of both parties; (2) the opportunity each 
party has to move the case forward; (3) what each of the 
parties has done to move the case forward; (4) what 
difficultly or prejudice may have been caused to the 
other side; and (5) most important, whether injustice may 
result from the dismissal. 
When considering these factors, along with the Affidavit of Judge 
Rokich and the fact that the trial was continued at the request of 
Defendants, the dismissal with prejudice was a clear abuse of 
discretion. 
A. CONDUCT OF BOTH PARTIES 
In footnote 5, Defendants assert that the continuance was the 
suggestion of Judge Rokich. This is a complete misreading of the 
Affidavit of Judge Rokich. R. 306-307. In that affidavit Judge 
Rokich states: 
5. At the September 17, 1994 scheduling conference 
between the Court and the above-mentioned parties, 
Defendants' counsel, Roger Sandack, indicated that he 
would be replaced by subsequent counsel and would not be 
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the attorney representing the Defendants at the time of 
trial. 
6. Based on the disclosures of Mr. Sandack and the 
consent of Mr. Petty, Affiant [Judge John A. Rokich] 
determined that it would be inappropriate to enter a 
scheduling order when counsel for Defendants was 
changing. Affiant [Judge Rokich] intended 'to set a 
schedule for the completion of this action after 
Defendants' new counsel had been designated. Affiant 
[Judge Rokich] intended to take no further action in 
regard to this case until substitute counsel for 
Defendants was designated. 
Defense counsel requested or suggested the continuance of the 
January 4, 1994 trial because of his alleged intent to withdraw. 
Despite his representations to the trial court, Mr. Sandack did not 
withdraw from this case until after the Motion to Dismiss had been 
filed some ten months later.1 Therefore, the critical delay that 
resulted in the case not being tried was caused by Defense 
counsel's representations to the trial court and his failure to 
withdraw in a timely manner. This delay cannot be attributed to 
Plaintiffs.2 
For Defendants to argue that they are not responsible for the 
continuation of the January 4, 1994 trial date and the ensuing 
delay defies reason. In filing the Motion to Dismiss for Failure 
i The Defendants state that " . . . Martineau's previous 
counsel, Roger Sandack, responded and appeared at all hearings and 
did not withdraw until July 1995". [emphasis in original]. Brief 
of Appellees, p. 14. Defendants' new counsel, Michael L. Deamer 
appeared on June 2, 1995 and filed the Motion to Dismiss at the 
same time he filed his Notice of Appearance of Counsel. R. 183-
186. 
2 In addition, Defendants failed to designate their 
expert and lay witnesses despite the Court Order of June 9, 1993. 
Having failed to name any witnesses, it is obvious that Defendants 
never intended to try this matter and they used every effort to 
delay and continue the trial date. 
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to Prosecute prior to Mr. Sandack's withdrawal, Defendants sought 
to be rewarded for Mr. Sandack's misstatements to the trial court 
and Defendants' own delay tactics. This Court should not allow 
this result to stand. "The ancient and honored maxim [is] that no 
one should benefit from his own wrong . . .." Prudential Federal 
Savings and Loan Association v. William L. Pereira and Associates, 
16 Utah 2d 365, 401 P.2d 439 (Utah 1965). The trial court's 
dismissal, which has rewarded Defendants for their delay tactics, 
should be reversed and the matter remanded for a trial on the 
merits. 
B. THE OPPORTUNITY OF EACH PARTY TO MOVE THE CASE FORWARD. 
Defendants assert that no action was taken by Plaintiffs to 
move this case forward. However, Defendants can not deny that but 
for Mr. Sandack's representation to the court in September, 1994, 
this case would have been tried in January, 1994 and the Motion to 
Dismiss would never have been heard or decided. ! 
Defendants argue that they attempted to move the case forward. 
However, the postponement of the trial resulted directly from the 
representation of Defendants' counsel that new counsel would be 
substituted. Because this postponement stopped the trial from 
going forward, all actions preceding the September pretrial are 
essentially irrelevant. Had the request to substitute counsel not 
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been made, the trial would have been held in January, 1994.3 
In the past, this Court has not tolerated one party sitting 
silently for a period of time and then attempting to blame the 
other party for delay. Department of Social Services v. Romero. 
609 P.2d 1323, 1324 (Utah 1980), Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. 
v. Paul W. Larsen Contractors. Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1977) . 
Any delay from the September pretrial until the June 2, 1995 Motion 
to Dismiss, was exclusively caused by the Defendants. Defendants 
requested time to change counsel, allowed time to pass, failed to 
name substitute counsel, and then used this passage of time as a 
reason to seek dismissal of the case. Defendants simply should not 
benefit from their own actions and misrepresentations. 
C. WHAT EACH PARTY DID TO MOVE THE CASE FORWARD. 
Defendants' Brief fails to address this specific issue. It 
must therefore be assumed that the position of the Plaintiffs is 
adopted by acquiescence. Plaintiffs moved this case forward to the 
point of scheduling the trial of the matter and attending the 
September pretrial held before Judge Rokich. Defendants averted 
this scheduled trial by claiming that counsel would be substituted. 
3 Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Complaint was 
considered at the pre-trial conference, at which time the Court 
continued the trial setting at the request of Defendants to change 
attorneys. Since Judge Rokich " . . . intended to take no further 
action in relation to this case until substitute counsel for the 
Defendants was designated", Affidavit of Judge Rokich, R. 306-307, 
the court did not rule on the Motion to Amend, which remains 
pending. 
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forthcoming, counsel for Defendants did not withdraw until after 
Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute. 
Defendants are simply attempting to take advantage of and benefit 
from their own delays. 
D. WHAT DIFFICULTY OR PREJUDICE WAS CAUSED TO DEFENDANTS. 
Defendants claim that because of the passage of time 
Plaintiffs have waived their claims of difficulty or prejudice as 
a result of the dismissal. However, the Supreme Court in 
Westinghouse did not hold that the enumerated factors could be 
waived by the passage of time. Despite the allegations of delay, 
the Supreme Court named the factors that must be considered in 
every case of dismissal for failure to prosecute. Furthermore, 
Defendants site no authority for their alleged waiver. In Living 
Scriptures. Inc. v. Kudlik. 890 P.2d 7, 9 (Utah App. 1995), the 
Court of Appeals sets forth the elements of waiver: 
The elements of waiver consist of: "(1) an existing 
right, benefit, or advantage; (2) knowledge of the 
existence of that right, benefit, or advantage; and (3) 
an intention to relinquish the right, benefit, or 
advantage." (citation omitted) 
The record is devoid of any intent by Plaintiffs to waive their 
rights. Clearly Plaintiffs had no "intention" to relinquish their 
claims against Defendants. There is no basis to presume that 
Plaintiffs waived any of their substantive rights.4 
4
 Defendants make much of Mr. Strand's incarceration. 
However, Mr. Strand does not forfeit his rights as a citizen of the 
United States and the State of Utah simply because he may not 
attend the trial or is incarcerated. Mr. Strand's deposition can 
be taken and entered into the record. In addition, the other 
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E. WHETHER INJUSTICE WILL RESULT FROM THE DISMISSAL. 
Great injustice occurred to Plaintiffs as a result of the 
dismissal because they suffered significant damages as a result of 
Defendants' accounting malpractice. Defendants double and triple 
charged Plaintiffs for work performed, misappropriated funds from 
Plaintiffs' checking accounts, filed improper tax returns, and 
caused the destruction of profitable businesses. The Utah Supreme 
Court called the injustice suffered by the dismissed party the 
"most important" of all the Westinghouse factors. The injustice 
suffered by Plaintiffs as a result of Defendants' malpractice is 
now compounded by the dismissal. Plaintiffs are entitled to have 
their day in court to receive compensation for the intentional and 
negligent acts of Defendants. 
Again, instead of directly confronting the injustice suffered 
by Plaintiffs as a result of the dismissal, Defendants focus on 
their own alleged injustice of disclosing the pending malpractice 
action and attorney's fees. Not only is Defendants' argument 
concerning disclosure and attorney's fees irrelevant, but based 
entirely on speculation. The record is devoid of any facts 
reflecting Defendants' disclosure of the malpractice action or any 
Plaintiffs are available to attend the trial. Defendants simply 
seek to cast aspersion on Plaintiffs because of Mr. Strand's 
situation. The Court should easily see through this blatant and 
inappropriate tactic. 
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resulting effect. The record contains no facts concerning the 
payment of attorney's fees. The malpractice insurer is likely to 
have covered the attorney's fees in any event. 
Defendants are offended that Judge Rokich would file an 
Affidavit in opposition to the dismissal. This offense arises out 
of Defendants' abhorrence to the truth. Judge Rokich's Affidavit 
establishes that the case would have been tried in January, 1994 
but for Roger Sandack's request to withdraw. Judge Rokich presided 
over the September pretrial hearing, when the January 4, 1994 trial 
date was stricken. He obviously believes that an injustice is 
being wrought upon the Plaintiffs by the dismissal. Judge Rokich 
ruled that if counsel was being changed, it would be inappropriate 
for the trial to go forward. 
In fact, Judge Rokich determined that there should be no 
further action in relation to the case until substitute counsel for 
Defendants had been designated. R. 306-307. Because the 
continuance of the scheduled trial and the subsequent delay was 
caused by Defendants, it is inappropriate for the Plaintiffs to be 
punished by the dismissal of the action. 
CONCLUSION 
Due process rights cannot be waived without an intentional 
relinquishment of the known right. The record reflects no waiver 
of Plaintiffs' rights. The trial court failed to consider the 
factors of Westinghouse and rendered an unreasoned, arbitrary 
10 
decision. Plaintiffs are entitled to have their day in court to 
pursue their claims against Defendants. 
Defendants requested that the trial date be stricken so that 
new counsel could take over the defense. But for the request to 
substitute counsel, the case would have been tried in January, 
1994. Despite the representation that counsel would withdraw, no 
withdrawal took place until Defendants' new counsel filed a Motion 
to Dismiss some ten months later. The Defendants' should not be 
rewarded with a dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims based on their own 
misrepresentations to the trial court and delays in the 
proceedings. 
This Court should afford the parties an opportunity to be 
heard and do justice between them by reversing the dismissal by 
reversing the trial court's dismissal of and remanding the matter 
for a trial on the merits. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J%h<4 day of July, 1996. 
— ^ £ = ^ 3 5 ^ L 
Daniel W. Jackson 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing to Michael L. Deamer, 139 East South Temple #330, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1169, postage prepaid, this ^j^J day 
of July, 1996. 
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AUG-28-iyy:> I^OH 
RECEIVED AUS 3 * 1S35 
Ralph C. Petty #2595 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1000 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 531-6686 




IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT: Q&SR% OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL W. STRAND, et ai., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
LELAND MARTINEAU, et al. , 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN A. ROKICH 
IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION TO 
SET ASIDE DISMISSAL AND 
REINSTATE PLAINTIFF'S ACTION 
Case No. 810905200CV 
Judge William 3. 3ohling 
) 
) ss 
County of Tooele 
State of Utah ) 
John A. Rokich, being duly sworn upon oath deposes and says: 
1. Affiant is a member cf the Utah Bar in good standing. 
2. Affiant is familiar with and has personal knowledge of the 
statements set forth in this Affidavit. 
3. Affiant was the judge assigned to the above entitled 
matter when it came before Affiant pursuant to a scheduling 
conference, en September 17, 1994. 
4. Affiant is competent to testify, and if called to testify, 
his testimony would establish the facts averred in this Affidavit. 
5. At the September 17, 1994 scheduling conference between 
the Court and the above mentioned parties, Defendants' counsel, 
Roger Sandack, indicated that he would be replaced by subsequent 
counsel and would not be the attorney representing the defendants 
000306 
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at Uxe time of trial, 
6. Based on the disclosures of Mr* Sandack, and the consent 
of Mr- Petty, Affiant determined that it would be inappropriate to 
enter a scheduling order when counsel for Defendants was changing. 
Affiant intended to set a schedule for the completion of this 
action after Defendants' new counsel had been designated. Affiant 
intended to take no further action in relation to this case until 
substitute counsel for Defendants was designated. 
7. A trial had been scheduled in this case for January, 1994. 
At a pretrial hearing for the trial, the parties, with Affiant's 
consent, agreed to continue the trial, without date. 
DATED this < 0 day of August, 1995. 
X \ J o h r i A. Rokich 
Subsc r ibed and sworn be fo re me t h i s CXc? day of Aucrust, 
1995. .-.— ^ ' 
c> 
I
 r J 
U \ . ... i 
I v - . • J A9rj:i.'.?r7 | Notary Publ ic ; r e s i d i n a a t 
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I certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing to Michael L. Deamer, 139 East South Temple # 330, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, postage prepaid, this day of 
August, 1995. J , . 
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